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It would seem that the most important effect of the renunciation
of a will by a widow arises in connection with the acceleration of
remainders. With the general rule as applied to vested remainders
we have no quarrel. However, the theory of election, when applied to
contingent remainders, frequently results in the total disruption of the
testator's plans for the disposition of his estate. It must be taken into
consideration that the electing party has the power in himself or her-
self to alter the disposition of the residue of the estate, and such power
is dangerous. There is a possibility that the electing spouse may be
influenced by those who would be benefited by an immediate vesting
of the contingent remainders.
5 It is entirely possible, for instance, for
a widow to elect to take against a will with which she is entirely
satisfied, merely to insure the vesting of a contingent remainder to a
son and away from other legatees.6
The courts of Massachusetts, though distinctly in the minority,
have announced what we consider to be the sounder rule. This court
holds that a different rule obtains in the case of a vested remainder
from that when it is contingent. In the latter case, the remainder Is
not accelerated by the election of the surviving spouse to take against
the will.7
From the viewpoint of both law and logic, the better way to treat
this problem, in order to reach the sounder conclusion of the minority,
is to consider the death of the surviving spouse as a physical event
upon which the contingency is to be decided. Considered thus, the
election could not have the effect of accelerating the contingent
remainders.
PHEAP SoHIF.
TORTS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PASSENGER IN
AUTOMOBILE
The deceased and two others were riding with defendant In his
car late at night and as his guests. Defendant complained to the
others of being very sleepy and requested them to stay awake and
talk to keep him from going to sleep. Shortly afterwards all of the
occupants of the car, except the defendant, went to sleep and he was
unable to arouse them. A few minutes later he also fell asleep, the
car ran off the road, and one of the guests was killed. Deceased's ad-
ministratrix brought suit against the driver for damages, alleging
negligence in the driver's operation of the car. The court sustained
the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Plaintiff appealed.
Held: The deceased was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law. No recovery. Affirmed. Rennolds Admx. v. Waggener, 271
Ky. 300, 111 S. W. (2d) 647, (1937).
Hauk v. McComas, 98 Ind. 460 (1884).
4Disston's Estate, 257 Pa. 537, 101 AtI. 804 (1917).
1 Sawyer v. Freeman, 161 Mass. 543, 37 N. E. 942 (1894). See also
Compton v. Rixey, 124 Va. 548, 98 S. E. 651 (1919).
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The court enunciated the rule fundamental in cases of this type
when it said :---"Ordinarily a duty is imposed upon the driver of an
automobile to use ordinary care for the safety of his guests, and unless
a danger is known ... he (the guest) may rely upon the assumption
that the driver will exercise such care; but there is a point where
passive reliance upon the driver ends and the duty of a guest to exer-
cise ordinary care for his own safety begins."1 This is based upon the
theory that every man must exercise ordinary care for his own safety.
If a guest does not exercise for his own safety the care of a reason-
ably prudent man under the circumstances, he is guilty of contributory
negligence and can not recover for injuries sustained by his failure to
exercise such care;2 and likewise, such contributory negligence of a
guest will prevent recovery for his death by his personal representa-
tive.3
The main question in the decision of the Waggener case was:
Did the deceased use the care required of him under the circumstances?
It is a well settled Kentucky rule that a guest who enters a car
with knowledge that the driver is intoxicated to such an extent that
he will probably not use due care in, or is not capable of, handling the
car is guilty of contributory negligence and can not recover for injuries
resulting from the negligence of the driver.4
After a discussion of the above rules, the court clarified the all
important question by analogy between a drunken driver and greatly
fatigued driver. It decided, very logically, that there was little, if any,
difference, and held that the above rule making it contributory negli-
gence to ride with one known to be drunk applied also in the case of a
driver known to be sleepy and greatly fatigued. This was the first
case in Kentucky in which such a rule has been applied.
Generally, the question of contributory negligence is one for the
jury. But there is a well recognized exception in cases where one
'Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Watkins, 37 F. (2d) 710 (1930);
Switzler v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 104 Cal. App. 138, 285 Pac. 918
(1930); Wallis v. Ill. C. R. Co., 247 Ky. 70, 56 S. W. (2d) 715 (1933);
Schieck v. New York C. R. Co., 233 App. Div. 121, 251 NS. Y. Supp. 564
(1931); Oppenheim v. Barkin, 262 Mass. 281, 159 N. E. 628 (1928)
(a case very similar in facts and holding to the present case); 5 Am.
Jur., Automobiles, Secs. 475, 476.
2 Rebillard v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. Co. (C. C. A., 6th),
216 F. 503, L. R. A. 1915B, 953 (1914); Boscarello v. N. Y., N. H. &
H. R. Co., 112 Conn. 279, 152 At. 61 (1930); Sharp v. Sproat, 111 Kan.
735, 208 Pac. 613, 26 A. L. R. 1421 (1922) ; Toppass v. Perkins' Admrx.,
268 Ky. 186, 104 S. W. (2d) 423 (1937); 5 Am. Jur., Automobiles,
Secs. 476, 479.
3 Smith's Admr. v. Nat. Coal & Iron Co., 135 Ky. 671, 117 S. W. 280
(1909); C. N. 0. & T. P. R. Co. v. Lovell's Admr., 141 Ky. 249, 132 S. W.
569 (1910).
4 Winston's Admr. v. City of Henderson, 179 Ky. 220, 200 S. W. 330,
L. R. A. 1918C, 646 (1918); Archer v. Bourne, 222 Ky. 268, 300 S. W.
604 (1927); Toppass v. Perkins' Admrx., 268 Ky. 186, 104 S. W. (2d)
423 (1937).
6 Nelson v. Meyers, 94 Cal. App. 66, 270 Pac. 719 (1928); Stephen-
son's Admrx. v. Sharp's Exrs., 222 Ky. 496, 1 S. W. (2d) 957 (1927);
CASE COMMENTS
conclusion only can be fairly drawn from the evidence, and in such
cases the question becomes one of law for the courts.6 In the Waggener
case the court applied the latter rule. RioHAn BusH, 3n
WILLS-CONSTRUCTJON-GIFT To ONE DURING WIDOWHOOD.
Testator devised his entire estate to his wife, "to be hers and
subject to her use and for her benefit, so long as she shall remain a
widow, after my death, and until she shall remarry." Other paragraphs
disposed of the estate in the event of such remarriage. An action was
brought by the executrix-widow for construction of the will to deter-
mine her power to execute a coal lease binding upon the estate, collect
rents and royalties, and hold same under the will. Held, that the
widow took a fee simple title subject to defeasance upon the event of
her remarriage. Thomas, J., dissenting. Davis v. Bennet's Exrx. et al.,
272 Ky. 674, 114 S. W. (2d) 1150 (1938).
As Is ably pointed out in the dissenting opinion, there are two
well-defined classes of cases of this general nature, the first arising
where there Is a devise of a fee simple title without qualifying or modi-
fying words, but to which is added a defeasance clause taking effect in
case of remarriage, or other words indicating an intention to create a
fee;1 the second where the devise is coupled with words providing for a
limitation over in the event of a subsequent remarriage.' It seems essen-
tial that any given case be regarded with this classification in mind.
This the Kentucky Court has done in previous cases,3 but seems to have
Deshazer v. Cheatham, 233 Ky. 59, 24 S. W. (2d) 936 (1930); Schrader
v. New York C. R. R. Co., 254 N. Y. 148, 172 N. E. 272 (1930); Lanstein
v. Acme White Lead & Color Works, 285 Mass. 328, 189 N. E. 44 (1934).
6Hines v. May, 191 Ky. 493, 230 S. W. 924 (1921); McMurtry's
Admrx. v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 194 Ky. 294, 239 S. W. 62 (1932);
Taecker v. Pickins, 58 S. D. 177, 235 N. W. 504 (1931); Tapp v. Ten-
nessee Electric Power Co., 9 Tenn. App. 632 (1929).
1 Cummings v. Lohr, 246 Ill. 577, 92 N. E. 970 (1910); Gaven v.
Allen, 100 Mo. 293, 13 S. W. 501 (1889); Weiss v. Mt. Vernon, 157 App.
Div. 383, 142 N. Y. Supp. 250 (1913); Redding v. Rice, 171 Pa. St. 301,
33 Atl. 330 (1895); Squier v. Harvey, 16 R. I. 226, 14 Atl. 862 (1888);
In re Weymouth's Will, 165 Wis. 455, 161 N. W. 373 (1917).
2 Belt v. Gay, 142 Ga. 366, 82 S. E. 1071 (1914); Brunk v. Brunk,
157 Ia. 51, 137 N. W. 1065 (1912) ; Cowman v. Glos, 255 Ill. 377, 99 N. E.
586 (1912); Hibbits v. Jack, 97 Ind. 570, 49 Am. Rep. 478 (1884);
Nash v. Simpson, 78 Me. 142, 3 Atl. 53 (1886); Hale v. Neilson, 112
Miss. 291, 72 So. 1011 (1916).
3 (a) In the following cases an intention to create a fee Is rea-
sonably clear, there being a defeasance clause operating in the event
of subsequent remarriage: Lehfart v. Scharre, 143 Ky. 849, 137 S. W.
775 (1911); Huerkamp v. Huerkamp, 145 Ky. 194, 140 S. W. 182 (1911);
Prindible v. Prindible, 186 Ky. 280, 216 S. W. 583 (1919); Hutter v.
Crawford, 225 Ky. 215, 7 S. W. (2d) 1043 (1928).
(b) In the following cases the words of the devise are so restric-
tive as to create a life estate, subject to termination in the event of a
subsequent remarriage: Napier, et ux. v. Davis, 7 J. J. Marsh. 283 (Ky.,
